Kia ora
There was an excellent level of renewals this year although many left it until the last week or so before December 1st which put quite a bit of pressure on the Aon team. Similarly, many of you will be under pressure from clients and contractors to provide information or issue Practical Completion Certificates prior to the break, but it goes without saying that it’s important to maintain the same standards that you would throughout the year.This issue of Communique begins with a couple of insurance ‘housekeeping’ articles provided by Aon.A member generously got in touch following an article in the October Communique about signing as an agent, noting that this situation arises in other areas like Building Consent applications, and so we have some observations on that.A recent notification about a cladding failure has prompted an article on the importance of using all the components of a building system and the requirement to observe that this is the case.And finally, this issue’s long-read is about the Grenfell Tower tragedy. While many of you may not see this as relevant to your own work because of its scale and location, there are nevertheless many lessons that can be applied to all projects. The context of the British situation was a government that was focused on de-regulation and cost reduction, placing even greater onus on the design team to ensure performance and safety. Wishing you all a relaxing break and all the best for the New Year.
Ngā mihi
To ensure a speedy response to queries that you might have about insurance requirements and clauses within a proposed professional services agreement, we recommend that you email nz.nzacs@aon.com. The team at Aon will review the incoming emails and identify the appropriate member of their team to respond to each enquiry in a timely manner.
Just a reminder of your obligations to your insurer to advise of any potential claim, even if you think the claim may cost less than your excess to resolve. Claim costs have a habit of growing rather than shrinking which is why your insurer needs to know as early as possible. Email nz.nzacs@aon.com as soon as possible if you have a claim notification.
Following an article in the last Communique, a member emailed raising the issue of architects being described as the owner’s agent when submitting a building consent application on behalf of clients via the SIMPLI portal. The member manages this by including a covering letter in the submission with an appropriate disclaimer. Note that it’s also possible to make any limitations to this role clear within the portal under the Section 3 OWNER AND AGENT INFORMATION. Under the Agent information column there is a field to describe the ‘Relationship to owner’. This is where one could clarify this arrangement with wording like “Agent for contact purposes only” or “Agent without any responsibility for Owner’s costs”. In addition, there is a field for ‘Payee** name for invoicing’ where you should put the owner’s name to make it very clear where the liability for payment lies.(** this should in fact be Payer not Payee)
Thanks to the NZIA Te Kahui Whaihanga for their assistance with this article.
There are many construction-related ‘systems’ available in New Zealand, ranging from cladding assemblies to multi-coat paint systems, but problems may arise from the substitution of components. Most manufacturers have clauses in their technical material that say that warranties will be invalidated if non-system components are used. If that happens, their liability may be shifted onto the design and construction team. Components like screw fixings, extrusions, tapes and adhesives may have layers of sophisticated design input that ensure that the system works as designed and tested. For example, a fixing might require:
So what should you be looking for during observation? It would be reasonable to expect an architect to do a spot check as part of a site observation role to confirm that the components being used are all part of the same system. Also:
Thanks to Board member John MacDonald who has taken the time to read some of the official reports on this tragedy and provide some salient – and sobering – comments.
Many members will have noted the recent publication of the full report from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, and will have read media reporting of the findings. None of the UK construction industry or its regulators comes out well, and there were systemic failings. However, of most direct relevance to NZACS members will be that the architect (“Studio E”) was found to have a very significant degree of responsibility for the disaster [Report clause 2.79]. In fact the report is damning both of the architectural firm and of several named practitioners within the firm - architects and architectural graduates. In more than one important respect, Studio E failed to meet the standards of a reasonably competent architect. [2.79 and 2.80].
72 people died as a result of a fire in an apartment block which had recently been reclad. The new windows and façade system, instead of containing or slowing a fire that started in an apartment as the Building Code anticipated, actually fuelled and spread that fire. There were numerous failings from almost everyone involved before and after the event, but ultimately the façade, external insulation, and window system were selected and specified by the architect.
The report is free to download, and very clearly written. It is well worth a read but in particular, Chapters 2 Executive Summary and 63 The Contribution of Studio E. The whole of Part 6 - The refurbishment of Grenfell Tower examines the recladding project itself and is relevant to architects. Report clauses are noted [XX.XX].
The lessons are all things that members could have read in Communique over the years, but are writ large:
When working in an unfamiliar field, upskill and seek help. Studio E had got the job via referral from another quite different project. They did not have the knowledge or experience to tackle a high rise apartment block and needed to upskill for this. Studio E identified this as a risk but then did little or nothing about it. They did not know what they did not know. We note that the report specifically does not condemn the architect for taking on a new field of work, but what is condemned is not then taking any serious steps to understand the basic problems of that field and assuming that they could pick it up as they went along. [63.5 – 63.6)
Know your responsibilities in law, in contract and in the team. Studio E failed to understand their role as architect not only in a broader sense but also specifically in their terms of engagement, before and after novation to the contractor. In many cases they assumed that someone else was doing what they should have been doing. Do not assume that something is “out of scope” until you have checked your terms of engagement. If the terms of engagement are not clear about what is in scope, then others will assume you are picking up a “typical” architectural scope (for example, NZIA AAS). [The architects] appear to have had their own understanding of the obligations being assumed by Studio E, which did not bear much relationship to the language used in [the agreement for services] [63.31]
The architect is responsible for their product selections and for ensuring the selection works and complies. This seems obvious but worth reiterating that any product selections are – or should be - considered choices. Others are entitled to expect that the architect has satisfied themselves that the selection meets requirements, and has worked out in sufficient detail how the use of that product will work on the particular project (at Grenfell for example, cavity barrier layouts should have been worked out by the architect). If you are relying on design aspects by subcontractors, they need to understand exactly what they are and are not expected to design, and what standard they are going to meet. You as architect should understand those standards (see also 7 below). [63.23]
Beware of “placeholder” selections or interim specifications. Especially if there are in-team handovers as the project progresses. If there are such “placeholder” selections, for example for a Preliminary Estimate of Cost, make sure you have processes in place to ensure that they are properly reviewed and considered before they become final. When handing over a project to a colleague, make sure that “half-selected” items are highlighted. When picking up a project from a colleague, look for any such placeholders or part-considered selections. [63.16]
Shop drawing reviews cover everything in the architect’s competence. Studio E thought they were reviewing only for something called “architectural intent” which apparently did not include anything to do with fire performance. They were wrong to think so. [63.37 to 63.40].
If you are lead designer, lead the design team. If the architect is employed as lead designer/consultant, then it is their job to brief and co-ordinate the other members of the design team, including the Fire Engineer. At Grenfell, Studio E was reassured generally by the fact that Exova [the fire engineer] had been instructed on the project, even though [the architect] did not provide Exova with the full range of information that would have enabled it to provide proper advice and did not question the limited advice that it did receive [63.28]. In addition to not seeking the right advice, Studio E appears not to have read the advice that the rest of the design team did give it.
Use industry guidance. Despite systemic failings in the UK industry there was ample good design and construction guidance in the UK, had Studio E decided to make use of it. It isn’t anyone else’s job to make sure that architects keep abreast of guidance relevant to the field they are working in. Understand the standards called up in the specifications. …no one at Studio E was familiar with the [relevant UK] standard or had even read it and no one troubled to check it at the time … As a result, Studio E specified products that did not meet any of that guidance [63.21]
Read the WHOLE of the BRANZ appraisal. They don’t have BRANZ appraisals in the UK but they do have BBA (British Board of Agrément) certificates, which play a similar role. Setting aside the strengths and weaknesses of BBA certs vs BRANZ appraisals, it was discovered that the Project Architects at Studio E didn’t feel that they had to read the whole of the BBA certificate in detail before specifying an unfamiliar product. That is not one of those decisions you ever want to be explaining to a judge. [63.35] It was a short document and plainly an important one [63.36] In addition to keeping building occupants physically safer, learning these lessons can also keep architects safer from civil liability. Because keeping safe from liability is all about meeting the standards of a reasonably competent architect.
Mercifully, we rarely have to address a disaster on this scale. Reading the wider report on Grenfell Tower could cause NZ architects to look more kindly than usual upon our industry in general and our Building Consent system in particular. In preparing for a Building Consent application, NZ design teams would be required to address fire compliance more directly than Studio E did in the UK, for example by a Council insisting on a IPENZ Practice Note 22-based process for relevant buildings. However, the “Loafer’s Lodge” fire in Wellington demonstrates that even in our tighter compliance environment, fatal fires can still occur in large buildings in New Zealand. Many of us will be aware that “passive fire” design requirements may not be achieved on site. If architects behave as it appears Studio E did, and assume that much of their job is in fact someone else’s problem, then some similar catastrophe here cannot be ruled out.